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GOOD ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE EU:  
LESSONS FROM WORK IN PROGRESS? 
‘Whereas previous environmental measures tended to be 
prescriptive in character with an emphasis 
on the ‘thou shalt not’ approach, 
the new strategy leans more towards a 
‘let’s work together’ approach.’ 
(Fifth Environmental Action Programme, 1993) 
1. Introduction 
The leading question in this book is to ascertain whether the notion of ‘European 
good governance’ offers operational parameters for policy practice and for institu-
tional relations within the EU, between the EU and its member states, and between 
European governments and European civil societies. This contribution is especially 
concerned with the question of whether the concept of good governance is relevant 
to European Environmental Law and, if so, in what sense and to what extent. 
1.1. Relevance of the White Paper 
The White Paper calls for a renewal of the ‘Community method’ by advocating less 
of a ‘top-down approach and an expansion of its policy tools with non-legislative 
instruments’.1 This approach could well have a bearing on environmental policies as 
we find that new instruments such as subsidies, taxation and tradable pollution 
rights, as well as gentlemen’s agreements, benchmarking and auditing are being in-
troduced within this sector.2 
 
* Associate Professor of Constitutional and Administrative Law at the School of Business, Pub-
lic Administration & Technology and the Institute of Governance Studies, University of 
Twente; researcher at the Netherlands Institute of Government, and an associated researcher 
at the Ius Commune Research School. 
1 White Paper, p. 4 (see also p. 8). 
2 Note the Fifth Environmental Action Programme (EAP), which will be discussed later in this 
contribution. 
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The White Paper presents five underlying principles of good governance: 
openness; participation; accountability; effectiveness; and coherence. Again, one can 
well imagine that these principles are relevant to environmental policies. Openness 
and participation, for instance, relate to the Directives on public access to infor-
mation on the environment,3 on environmental impact assessment (EIA)4 and on in-
tegrated pollution prevention control (IPPC)5 and the regulation on the European 
Environment Agency.6 Likewise, the principle of Coherence has a bearing on article 
6 EC, which states that ‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated 
into the definition and implementation of the Community policies (…).’ 
1.2. Focus on Legal Policies 
All in all, a sufficient basis for further analysis. In this contribution the analysis will 
focus on the choice of legal policies in environmental law. That is to say on the spe-
cific choice of and the (possible) guidelines in the use of (binding) legal instruments. 
This objective requires research to be conducted into the (possible) match between 
the Commission’s ‘principles of good governance’, on the one hand, and the legal 
cornerstones of and existing legal policy practices in environmental law in Europe, 
on the other.  
With regard to ‘legal cornerstones’ we will focus on relevant primary EC law, 
such as the provisions of article 2 (‘… a high level of protection and improvement of 
the quality of the environment’), article 3 (‘A policy in the sphere of the environ-
ment’), article 6 (the aforementioned integration principle), article 174 (objectives, 
aims, principles, relevant data and international agreements with regard to Com-
munity environmental policies), arts. 175 and 176 (concerning voting procedures 
and the right to retain or introduce unilateral measures), as well as the notion of 
sustainable development (art. 2 EC and art. B of the EU Treaty: ‘… and to achieve 
balanced and sustainable development,…’). One can imagine that these primary 
‘cornerstones’ of EU environmental law offer a basis for a specified range of ‘appro-
priate environmental policy-practices’, in which certain legal instruments may or 
may not play a part (or only under certain premises or conditions).  
Research into the relationship between the Commission’s principles of good 
governance and the environmental legal policies that are being pursued or are pres-
ently in preparation, requires a closer look at the main environmental measures 
(such as directives) and programmes (mainly the EAPs) that have been put forward 
by the EC. Both horizontal or non-sectoral legislation and key vertical or sectoral leg-
islation offer an interesting perspective as instances of legal policy making – espe-
cially with a view to what types of legislation are being used, such as framework 
directives, directives that leave room for implementation by co-regulation, resolu-
tions, and white and green papers.  
With these (above) approaches there is a focus on the EC level. Clearly the 
White Paper also includes the level of global, national, regional and local authori-
 
3 Directive 2003/4, (2003) OJ L 41. 
4 Directive 85/337, (1997) OJ L 73/5 (amended). 
5 Directive 96/61, (1996) OJ L 257/26 (amended). 
6  (1999) OJ L 117/1. 
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ties.7 It will not be possible to address all of these levels in this contribution, howev-
er. Because the success of legal policies primarily rests with implementation on the 
national level, a concise analysis will be presented of some trends in member states’ 
environmental law in conjunction with legal policy choices on the Community lev-
el.8 
1.3. Perspective 
This contribution aims to present a broad view rather than an in-depth analysis of 
good governance and environmental law in Europe. The function of the contribu-
tions on substantive issues in this book is to determine whether the notion of good 
governance strikes a chord in these areas. This contribution is therefore not primari-
ly meant to serve environmental law experts, but rather those members of the gen-
eral legal public who are interested in matters of governance and law.9 
The subtitle ‘work in progress’ might be taken to suggest that the principles 
and initiatives in the White Paper are still far removed from today’s environmental 
policy making. It can also be taken to imply that environmental legal policy making 
has been a ‘front runner’ in opening up the perspective of good governance, albeit 
that the goals have not yet been achieved. Thus an analysis of environmental legal 
policy making could be interesting in the sense that it offers a view on how the 
principles of good governance function in practice and will hopefully serve to show 
which of the two interpretations holds true.  
Firstly, however, we will look at how we must understand the notion of gov-
ernance and indeed the notion of good governance, in order to fine-tune this article’s 
contribution (see § 2). Then we will analyse the environmental legal cornerstones 
and legal policy practice (in § 3 to § 6) against the backdrop of the five main princi-
ples of good governance. In view of these finding a conclusion will be drawn (in § 7) 
as to whether we are witnessing a shift in European environmental governance and 
how the results of the analysis relate to the (possible) future framework of the EU 
draft constitution. 
2. Good Governance 
The aim of first addressing the notion of good governance in a more general way is 
to obtain a clearer picture of what we should be looking for when comparing the 
Commission’s approach with the cornerstones and practices of environmental law 
in Europe.  
 
7 White Paper, p. 10. 
8 The observations in this regard are mainly been derived from R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Hel-
deweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), Public Environmental Law in the European Union and the Unit-
ed States, A Comparative Analysis, Kluwer Law International 2002, especially the chapter on 
comparative remarks. 
9 For this reason this contribution relies more heavily on the corpus of existing law (‘that which 
is already there’). 
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2.1. The Principles of Good Governance 
The White Paper lists five principles underlying the notion of good governance (on 
the basis of democracy and the rule of law) at all levels of government:10 1) Open-
ness, which primarily means active communication by the institutions and making 
governmental decisions more accessible and better understandable; 2) participation, 
mainly by ensuring wide involvement throughout the whole policy chain; 3) ac-
countability, which entails that institutions and member states explain their actions 
and take the necessary responsibility for such actions; 4) effectiveness, requiring 
that policies are effective and timely, with clear objectives, an evaluation of their fu-
ture and past impact, and are pursued at the proper level and implemented in a 
proportionate way; 5) coherence, necessitating that policies and actions cross the 
boundaries of sectoral policies, are performed with a clear view as to overall con-
sistency and are more easily understood. 
Furthermore, the White Paper suggests a number of proposals for change: 1) 
better involvement in shaping and implementing EU policies; 2) improving the 
quality and enforcement of EU policies; 3) a stronger link between European gov-
ernance and the rest of the world; 4) refocusing the role of the institutions.11  
2.2. The Concept of Good Governance  
 
The White Paper offers little clarity concerning the concept of governance:  
‘“Governance” means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which 
powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence’.12 
The core element in governance seems to be the (closer) relationship between gov-
ernment and civil society. It takes a ‘joint venture’ between government and society 
to set and to implement policy targets. In this respect, according to the White Paper, 
‘…, people have disappointed expectations but expectations nevertheless’. There-
fore, ‘A better use of powers should connect the EU more closely to its citizens and 
lead to more effective policies.’ This reflects the current view of many democratic 
welfare states that the relationship between government and society has shifted 
from a top-down (vertical) relationship to a reciprocal (or more horizontal) one. In 
legal terms the primacy of collective decision making may still rest with govern-
ments, but the choice of policies, with regard to both the targets and the means of 
achieving such targets and their implementation, require a ‘closer harmony’ with 
those members of society that are mainly involved. Organizations representing civil 
society13 mobilize people and support. Moreover, they can serve as an early warn-
ing system for political debate. The EU wants to encourage the development of civil 
 
10 Ibidem. 
11 White Paper, p. 11. 
12 White Paper, p. 8, n. 1. 
13 See for a definition, White Paper, p. 14, n. 9. 
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society and expects organizations representing civil society to follow the principles 
of good governance.14 
2.3. The Theory of Good Governance 
If the White Paper aims to renew of the Community method then we need to reflect 
somewhat more closely on the types of governance and the shifts therein as pre-
sented in the academic literature.  
In a strategic study commissioned by the Netherlands Organisation for Scien-
tific Research (NWO), entitled: ‘Shifts in governance: Problems of Legitimacy and Ac-
countability’, Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden presented an overview of the 
various strands in the academic governance discourse.15 The authors discuss chang-
es in governance concerning the fact that traditional ways of governing society, pol-
itics and the economy are changing. These changes take place in various forms in 
location, in capabilities and in styles of governance. It is interesting to note the dif-
ferent meanings given to the concept of governance in the literature, with a view to 
questions of legitimacy and accountability:16 firstly, governance as in good govern-
ance, secondly, governance as in Governing without Government, and thirdly, govern-
ance in Neo-Institutional Economics. 
Good governance in the ‘World Bank view’ refers to a sound and sustainable 
economic development, efficient government, effective civil society and a successful 
private sector, based on a participatory and liberal democratic tradition, equity, 
equality and the rule of law. In both the private and the public sector, we find 
strands of this good governance concept.17 
Governing without government is often used with reference to global govern-
ance, considering the non-hierarchical relations between interdependent states. In 
networks theory we find this concept in relation to the idea of governance taking 
place in pluricentric networks, in contrast to multicentric (market) and unicentric 
(hierarchical/state) forms of governance, and also in multi-level governance (both in 
intrastate and/or international relations).18 
Neo-institutional economics emphasizes that markets are not spontaneous social 
orders but are created and maintained by institutions laying down and enforcing 
the basic rules of the game and structuring incentives. Economic transactions are 
not only governed by governments but by all kinds of governance structures, whose 
mechanisms are subject to renewed study. 
 
14 White Paper, p. 15. 
15 K. van Kersbergen and F. van Waarden, Shifts in Governance: Problems of Legitimacy and Ac-
countability, Paper on the theme ‘Shifts in Governance’ as part of the NOW’s Strategic Plan 
2002-2005, July 2001, p. 4-77.  
16 Ibidem, p. 15. Note that I have taken the liberty of regrouping their presentation in three 
main clusters. 
17 Under the heading of corporate governance and new public management. 
18 Governing without governments is also a key issue with reference to the ability of civil socie-
ty, especially of local societies, to self-organize and self-manage their common pool resources 
and prevent their depletion. 
Good Environmental Governance in the EU 
6 
2.4. Shifts? 
Unfortunately the White Paper does not explicitly link its definition of governance 
to any of the above strands of academic literature. In my view, however, the ‘World 
Bank view’ seems closest to the Commission’s objectives, especially with regard to 
the stronger involvement of citizens and civil society in EU policy making and poli-
cy implementation. This view also holds true, if we compare the White Paper pro-
posals with some of the so-called ‘shifts in governance’, that is to say changes in 
types or styles, models or modes of governance, also presented in Van Kersbergen 
and Van Waarden’s article.19 
Clearly, although the right to a judicial review is a baseline for the White Pa-
per,20 the ‘shift from governmental to court governance’ is not an objective of the 
White Paper. The same applies to the ‘shift from governance through public to gov-
ernance through semi-public organizations’ – although the White Paper does pro-
pose an increase in the number of regulatory agencies. However, this is limited to 
areas where one single public interest is predominant and the choices available have 
little or no political content.21 
Furthermore, the White Paper highlights the need to reinforce the ‘culture of 
consultation and dialogue’22 and the Commission advocates that civil society must 
itself follow the principles of good governance,23 if only to offer a basis for co-
regulation.24 A ‘shift from governance by public to governance by private organiza-
tions’, however, is not the objective of the White Paper, but, at its best, it aims to re-
new the Community method by ‘[…] the refocusing of the Institutions [...]’.25 
For that same reason one could argue that a ‘shift from government to net-
work governance’ does not seem to feature in the White Paper’s plans. Clearly the 
Commission’s objective of ‘renewal’ is not a project leading up to shared legal pow-
ers with civil society actors. Even co-regulation is proposed under the firm condi-
tion that ‘[...] a framework of overall objectives, basic rights, enforcement and 
appeal mechanisms, and conditions for monitoring compliance is set in the legisla-
tion.’26 Still, the White Paper does indeed propose a closer linkage between EU insti-
tutions (and member states’ governments), on the one hand, and civil society, on the 
other. Such a closer link can only be achieved through, amongst other things, more 
openness and more room for participation. It requires opening up towards society 
and considering it to be a more trustworthy partner in collective decision making. 
This would amount to pluricentrism only in the more moderate sense of agreeing 
that ‘governments in Europe’ need to interact and indeed co-operate in social net-
works and should promote the existence of such networks. 
 
19 Ibidem, p. 29–50. 
20 If only because it follows on from the (explicitly adhered to) rule of law. 
21 The present EEA (European Environmental Agency) does not belong to this category. 
22 Ibidem, p. 16. 
23 Ibidem, p. 15. 
24 Ibidem, p. 21. 
25 Ibidem, p. 33. 
26 Ibidem, p. 21. 
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2.5. Focus 
The White Paper does not propose a revolutionary shift. That, however, is not to say 
that its main objective of a closer relationship between governments in Europe and 
Europe’s civil societies, embedded in a notion of good government that is similar to 
the World Bank’s perspective, should not be taken seriously.  
In the following analysis this ‘closer relationship’ offers an important view-
point as regards environmental law in Europe. An attempt will be made to deter-
mine if the good governance approach reaches beyond the scope of ‘more interaction’ 
and extends to neo-institutional governance which involves the introduction of inno-
vative legal policies in the shape of new environmental policy instruments. Is there 
a move towards ‘market-based instruments’ that appeal to a ‘shared responsibility’ 
(such as ‘economic’ or indirect and ‘suasive’ or self-regulatory instruments), away 
from or in addition to command and control (or direct/top-down) regulation?27 The 
outcome of this analysis will – hopefully – add to a better understanding of the 
White Paper’s principles of good governance and offer a position for a (critical) ap-
praisal of the EU draft Constitution. 
For the reason of more easily introducing ‘Environmental Law in Europe’ to 
‘non-specialists’, the analysis will commence with the good governance principles 
of coherence and effectiveness, to be followed by accountability and will conclude with 
a combined analysis of openness and participation. 
3. Coherence 
The principle of coherence stresses the need for overall consistency across the bound-
aries of sectoral policies. Thus, not only can it serve the overall effectiveness of poli-
cies, but it can also make policies easier to understand, thus creating a baseline for 
civil society’s involvement. From the point of view of environmental law a few as-
pects are clearly related to this principle. 
3.1. Sustainability and Integration 
Article 2 EC lays down the Community task of (among other things) promoting a: 
‘[…].. harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, 
[…] sustainable […] growth, […] a high level of protection and improvement of the 
quality of the environment […].’ Article 2 of the EU Treaty lists the objective: ‘[…] to 
achieve balanced and sustainable development […]’. Sustainable development is 
defined in the 5th Environmental Action Programme (EAP) as: ‘continued economic 
and social development without detriment to the environment and the natural re-
 
27 See, for instance: A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, ‘European Governance and 
the Transfer of ‘New’ Environmental Policy Instruments (NEPI’s) in the European Union’, 81 
(3) Public Administration, 2003, p. 555-574 and B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, ‘Old wine in 
new bottles? The Commission and the use of environmental policy instruments’, 81 (3) Public 
Administration, 2003, p. 575-606. 
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sources on the quality of which continued human activity and further development 
depend.’28 
It is generally assumed that the introduction of the concept of sustainability 
(and the reference in article 2 EC to ‘a high level of protection’) does make it clear 
that there is no (longer a) hierarchy between the economic and the ecological objec-
tives of the EU/EC.29 Furthermore, sustainability requires a closer and more ‘posi-
tive’ relationship between environmental policies and other policy areas. This also 
follows from the integration principle of article 6 EC. Due to this article, ‘Environ-
mental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and imple-
mentation of the Community policies and activities referred to in article 3, in partic-
ular with a view to promoting sustainable development.’ The wording ‘must be’ 
means that the external integration of environmental objectives, amongst which are 
the requirements of article 174 EC (see below), is achieved in other policy sectors.30 
The integration principle does not mean that the environment has priority over oth-
er policy areas; it primarily serves to underline the emancipation of environmental 
policies. If, however, within another policy area an objective can be attained in a 
number of ways and without prejudice, article 6 EC would require that the best en-
vironmental option is chosen. We must keep in mind, though, that the EC/EU insti-
tutions have a broad discretion when it comes to defining environmental policy – a 
discretion that will be marginally tested by the courts.31 
Several strategic EC initiatives underpin the importance of integration and 
sustainability.32 Already in 1983, in the 3rd EAP, the notion of integrating environ-
mental policy making into other policy areas was launched.33 Subsequently the 4th 
EAP, which appeared after the Single European Act, strengthened the call for inte-
grated policy making.34 The most explicit call to escape from ‘the environmental 
ghetto’ was made by the introduction of the new policy of ‘sustainability’,35 in the 
5th EAP. Policy concerns were addressed in target sectors, such as energy, agricul-
ture, industry and tourism, by a better application of the ‘polluter pays principle’ 
 
28 OC(1993) C 138/1, p. 12. See also art. 2(4) of regulation (3062/95) on Tropical Forests, (1995) 
OJ L 327/9, and, with reference to the 1987 Brundtland Report, the definition in P. Sands, 
Principles of International Environmental Law, part I, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
1994, p. 198, a development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
29 G. van Calster, ‘Public Environmental Law in the European Union’, in R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. 
Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), Public Environmental Law in the European Union and the 
United States, A Comparative Analysis, Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 465 –515, at p. 474. 
J.H. Jans, European Environmental Law, Europa Law Publishing, 2000, p. 9.  
30 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 18. Note: ‘must be’ does not detract from the fact that art. 174(3) EC 
includes merely as ‘taking account of’ certain aspects of environmental policy making.  
31 Ibidem, p. 21-22; G. van Calster, supra note 30, p. 477. 
32 For a summary, see: J. Scott, ‘Law and Environmental Governance in the EU’, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2002, p. 996-1005. 
33  (1983) OJ C 46/1. See also B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note27, p. 576-577.  
34  (1987) OJ C 328/1. 
35 B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note 27, p. 577 (following D.A. Schön and M. Rein, 
Frame reflection. Toward the resolution of intractable policy controversies, New York, Basic Books, 
p. 4). 
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(through the internalization of external costs) and by promoting participation and 
the notion of ‘shared responsibility’.36 
In 1998 at the Cardiff summit the Council accepted the Commission’s ‘Partner-
ship for Integration’ report,37 in which environmental integration was presented as a 
‘chief concern’ in the EU and it was stipulated that the dialogue between sectoral 
and environmental policy makers (on all levels) should be facilitated. In 2001, at the 
Gothenburg European Council, the Commission responded to the Council’s request 
at the Helsinki summit of 1999 that a proposal should be prepared for a long-term 
strategy dovetailing policies for economically, socially and ecologically sustainable 
development. The final document, A Sustainable Europe for a better world: A European 
Union Strategy for sustainable development,38 offered a promising perspective. This 
was met by further support in the 6th EAP, 39 which called for support for environ-
mental integration ‘by effective environmental assessment of new policy proposals’. 
The Gothenburg conclusions called upon the Commission to present mechanisms to 
ensure sustainability impact assessments on all major policy proposals, covering 
economic, social and environmental consequences. Although this presentation of 
mechanisms was expected at the Laeken summit of 2001 it was not until the 2002 
Barcelona summit that the Commission – merely – underlined the need to assess 
‘the overall impact and coherence of policies (…) against overall long term objec-
tives’, adding that ‘The Commission is currently developing mechanisms for as-
sessing the sustainability impact.’40 Meanwhile in 2001 the Directive on strategic 
environmental assessment, relevant to strategic policy proposals, was adopted.41 
Through article 6 EC the environmental principles of article 174 EC (like the 
precautionary principle – see also § 5) can become interpretative guidelines for set-
ting environmental standards both within and outside the environmental policy ar-
ea. Together with the concept of sustainability (in art. 2 EC and art. B of the EU 
Treaty) this should benefit the overall consistency in environmentally relevant deci-
sion making in the EC. It should be remembered, though, that the integration prin-
ciple only binds the Community institutions and, strictly speaking, not the member 
states.42 In the course of secondary legislation and its implementation, however, 
member states will be increasingly bound by external integration – for instance, on 
the basis of the Directive on strategic environmental assessment. Work is currently 
being done to formulate further guidelines for translating the integration principle 
into other policy areas.43 
 
36 Ibidem. 
37 COM(1998) 333 final. 
38 COM(2001) 264. See also: Presidency Conclusions, Gothenburg European Council, 15-16 June 
2001, especially. 4-8.  
39 Further discussed below, under § 4.1. 
40 Presidency Conclusions, Barcelona European Council, 15-16 March 2002, especially 15 and 
furthermore 27-39. 
41 Directive 2001/42, (2001) OJ L 197/30. 
42 See case C-379/92 Peralta 1994 [ECR] I-3453.  
43 <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/environment/index_en.htm>. 
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3.2. Coherence and IPPC 
When discussing integrated policy making, we should also consider the Directive 
on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC).44 This Directive is primarily 
concerned with a more integrated, ‘horizontal’ approach to environmental prob-
lems. Instead of separately controlling emissions into the air, water and soil – there-
by running the risk that pollution is transferred from one medium to the other– this 
Directive offers a framework for an integrated approach. The focus of integration 
lies in the granting of permits (arts. 4-9). Member states are under an obligation to 
ensure that the conditions of and the procedure for issuing a permit are fully co-
ordinated if more than one public authority is competent (art. 7). The authorities 
concerned should orientate towards an effective integrated approach to the pro-
posed activity. The Directive also lays down a number of generally applicable sub-
stantive criteria (art. 3). The permit itself is to include specific requirements for air, 
water and soil protection, and for pollutants that are likely to be emitted from the 
installation in question. The permit should also include emission limit values (based 
on the best available techniques – BAT) (art. 9). 
Although the introduction of general environmental law codes had already 
began in the member states before the IPPC Directive was introduced, this Directive 
has clearly given a new impetus to this trend, if only by the requirement that when 
issuing permits there is to be co-ordination between different environmental sectors. 
In some cases – as in Denmark, Ireland and the Netherlands – member states have 
gone beyond co-ordination and have (fully) integrated permits.45 Because the IPPC 
Directive also requires BAT standards, one can expect that many general environ-
mental law codes will also be(come) framework legislation, laying down compe-
tences for setting quality standards and emission limit values. 
3.3. Summing Up 
Amongst environmental law specialists it is a well-known statement that external 
integration begins with internal integration. For this the IPPC Directive is relevant 
because it obliges member states to integrate environmental care internally. This in-
ternal integration is increasingly matched by general environmental law codes in 
the various member states. Furthermore, in several directives, such as the Nitrate, 
the Post-Seveso II, the Wild birds and the Habitats Directives,46 one can find examples 
of linking environmental care to spatial planning, so as to ensure external integra-
tion.47 The Nitrate Directive, for example, requires that the member states designate 
vulnerable zones containing areas of land that drain into waters identified by the 
same member state as being affected by nitrate pollution (on the basis of community 
 
44 See n. 5. 
45 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 573, as well as  
p. 97 and p. 103 (Denmark), p. 257 (Ireland) and p. 358 (the Netherlands). 
46 Directive 91/676, (1991) OJ L 375/1; Directive 96/82, (1997) OJ L 10/13; Directive 79/409, 
(1979) OJ L 103/1 (amended); Directive 92/34, (1992) OJ L 206/7. 
 The difficulties relating to the different procedures following from art. 175(2) EC will be dis-
cussed in § 5.2 (accountability; procedures). 
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standards). For these zones action programmes are to be set up, also entailing man-
datory measures, such as limit values. In the Post-Seveso II Directive on hazardous 
accidents, member states are obliged to ensure that town and country planning 
takes account of higher risks in areas surrounding hazardous activities. The Direc-
tives on wild birds and on habitats48 include obligations for town and country plan-
ning to establish, for instance, special conservation areas. In a similar sense the 
Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment49 improves external integration. 
Furthermore, the Directive on strategic environmental assessment shows that the 
concept of sustainability offers a platform for external integration on the level of 
strategic planning or programming in different policy areas. Meanwhile on the 
member state level we find that in some cases, such as in Austria, Denmark, France 
and the Netherlands, attempts are being made to link plans more closely in the are-
as of the environment, urban planning and nature conservation.50 On a more gen-
eral note, one can also conclude that the notion of sustainability (as included in art. 
2 EC and taken from the Rio Convention) is on the increase in member states’ policy 
statements and general legislation and certainly also in planning documents.51 
From the point of view of coherence, also in the sense of making environmental 
law more understandable, the question remains whether the introduction of a gen-
eral environmental law code in a number of member states should be followed at 
the EC level. Such a comprehensive general framework directive could also give 
guidelines for policy co-ordination. 
More importantly, however, integration and sustainability clearly strike a 
chord with the notions of shared responsibility amongst all the social actors in-
volved and a more bottom-up (as against top-down) approach may be seen in the 
choice of instruments. Nevertheless taking the step from the ‘declaratory level’ to 
the ‘operational level’52 still poses serious problems. This will be commented up in 
the next section (especially under § 4.1). 
4. Effectiveness 
The principle of effectiveness is especially interesting with regard to the introduction 
of new environmental instruments, signifying a turn towards a market-based ap-
proach embedded in the notion of shared responsibility between government and 
civil society. For the purpose of discovering whether such a shift away from ‘com-
mand and control’ legislation has taken or is taking place, a number of relevant as-
pects have been selected. 
 
48 See n. 46. 
49 Directive 85/337, (1985) OJ L 175/40, with a major amendment by Directive 97/11, (1997) OJ 
L 73/14. 
50 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8: Austria, p. 14; 
Denmark, p. 102-103; France, p. 183-184; the Netherlands, p. 355-357 and, generally, p 57. 
51 Ibidem, p. 572. 
52 B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note 27, p. 575. 
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4.1. Strategic EC Environmental Policy Perspective 
According to article 175, paragraph 3 EC the Community is to adopt general action 
programmes, setting priority objectives, on the basis of which the Council is to take 
the necessary initiatives (by introducing measures) whereby these objectives can be 
attained. Earlier, in § 3.1 of this contribution, some of these EAPs were already men-
tioned. Even before article 175 EC was introduced the Community had adopted its 
first EAPs, setting priorities for a time scale of 4 to 5 years. Plans were presented in 
1973, 1977, 1983, 1987 and 1993.53 Each of these plans had its own focus. The first 
two EAPs were mainly concerned with setting the objectives and principles and 
pointing out the most essential remedial actions. The third EAP was primarily con-
cerned with the preventive approach and integrating the environment in a socio-
economic context. Promoting a high level of protection by the use of strict environ-
mental standards was the main element in the fourth EAP.  
For this contribution the Fifth EAP is especially interesting, as it was the first 
EAP with a truly strategic content. Its title, ‘Towards Sustainability’, indicated that 
environmental policies were to entail a change in patterns of behaviour in society as 
a whole, especially through the much stronger involvement of all social actors. The 
aforementioned notion of ‘shared responsibility’ is presented as a prerequisite for 
sustainable development and is understood to entail ‘partnerships’ with and partic-
ipation of social and economic actors in setting and implementing environmental 
policies, through applying a much broader range of instruments: more bottom-up 
(as in self-regulation, by labelling and auditing), more market-based (e.g. taxes and 
fiscal measures) and more ‘horizontal’ or ‘suasive’ actions (support by means of 
public information and education). 
In 1998 a review of this Fifth EAP was presented,54 stressing, amongst other 
things, the need for: 1) a more consistent approach to the integration principle; 2) 
the use of a broader range of instruments; 3) investing in better communication, dif-
fusion of information, training and education so as to increase awareness concern-
ing the need for greater sustainability and to promote the required behavioural 
changes. 
Finally, in 2002, the sixth EAP, ‘Environment 2010: Our Future, Our Choice’, was 
launched.55 To achieve improvements in priority areas, such as climate change and 
nature and biodiversity, five approaches are set out. According to this EAP, these 
approaches: 
‘emphasize the need for more effective implementation and more innovative solutions. 
The Commission recognizes that a wider constituency must be addressed, including 
businesses that can only gain from a successful environmental policy. The Programme 
seeks new and innovative instruments for meeting complex environmental challenges. 
Legislation is not abandoned, but a more effective use of legislation is sought together 
with a more participatory approach to policy making. The five key approaches are to: 
1) Ensure the implementation of existing environmental legislation; 2) Integrate envi-
 
53 (1973) OJ C 112/1; (1977) OJ C 139/1; (1983) OJ C 46/1; (1987) OJ C 328/1 and (1993) OJ C 
138/1. 
54 Decision 2179/98, (1998) OJ L 275/1 
55 Decision of 22.07.2002, (1998) OJ L242. 
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ronmental concerns into all relevant policy areas (applying the Integration principle – 
MAH); 3) Work closely with business and consumers to identify solutions; 4) Ensure 
better and more accessible information on the environment for citizens; 5) Develop a 
more environmentally conscious attitude towards land use. The new Programme pro-
vides the environmental component of the Community’s forthcoming strategy for 
sustainable development. It continues to pursue some of the targets from the Fifth En-
vironment Action Programme, which came to an end in 2000. But the new Sixth Envi-
ronment Action Programme (…) goes further, adopting a more strategic approach. It 
calls for the active involvement and accountability of all sections of society in the 
search for innovative, workable and sustainable solutions to the environmental prob-
lems we face’.56 
It is worth noticing, explicitly in the above quote, that ‘legislation is not abandoned’ 
and that the implementation of existing environmental legislation must be ensured. 
Perhaps the 6th EAP is an attempt to promote new instruments based on the view 
that conventional instruments should be retained. Or, in other words, a proposal 
aimed at a ‘flexible response’ to existing and forthcoming environmental problems, 
which will more frequently lead to the use of a mix of instruments in order to tackle 
one and the same environmental problem. Furthermore, the 6th EAP is the first EAP 
to be adopted under the co-decision procedure (as agreed upon in the Maastricht 
Treaty) and can be considered to have an even greater legal significance; maybe it is 
even legally binding, as Rittberger and Richardson proclaim.57 Certainly this could 
add some weight to the question of whether the present EAP is yet another instance 
in a series of merely ‘declaratory’ strategy documents or whether it presents a doc-
ument that by virtue of its legal stature requires that its (key) elements and pro-
posals are made operational.  
In the following we will look at this operational level, along the lines of the in-
stitutional framework for introducing new environmental instruments. Firstly, we 
will look at a leading EC principle, that of proportionality, and, secondly, the inter-
play between the EC and its member states, mainly with a view to the implementa-
tion of EC legislation. In conclusion a few examples of the attempts to introduce 
new environmental instruments will be presented. 
4.2. Proportionality 
According to the guidelines included in the Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam on 
the interpretation of the principle of proportionality, listed under article 5 EC (‘Any 
action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the ob-
jectives of this treaty.’),58 the Community should aim for measures that respect na-
tional legal provisions to the greatest extent and (that) leave the highest degree of 
discretion to the member states. Directives are preferred above regulations and 
framework directives are preferred above detailed legislation. The use of minimum 
standards (such as for emissions) is generally preferred, because it leaves room for 
 
56 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/newprg/index.htm DD 24/02/2003>.  
57 B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note 27, p. 582. 
58 Considered to be of great importance to the principles of good governance: White Paper,  
p. 10-11. 
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member states to decide whether or not to apply stricter standards. Furthermore, 
non-binding measures, such as recommendations and voluntary codes of conduct, 
should be used where possible.59 
Clearly in environmental law the Directive is the main operational regulatory 
device, with an increasing preference for using minimum standards. Framework di-
rectives are now in operation in the areas of water,60 air61 and waste.62 They allow 
for further regulations through ‘daughter directives’ in which we find emission lim-
it values and/or quality standards or objectives (possibly linked to a standstill re-
quirement).63 Establishing these daughter directives can be mandatory on the basis 
of a list of substances or other pollutants or of products or other recipients which 
are susceptible to environmental harm.64 Further regulation on the member state 
level is accommodated by explicitly allowing competence to maintain or introduce 
more stringent standards.65 
Minimum harmonization, even when it is exhaustive, leaves room for member 
states to introduce more stringent standards and is therefore more readily used 
where the internal market is less affected, as in the case of (minimum standards for) 
the quality of water and air, as well as for flora and fauna.66 A directive that offers 
minimum rather than total harmonization67 is often recognized by the so-called 
‘minimum harmonization clause’. This clause, however, is increasingly less used as 
member states can always have recourse to article 176 EC and unilaterally introduce 
or maintain more stringent protective measures (if they are otherwise compatible 
with the Treaty) – although this matter is still subject to some debate.68 
Often, regulatory discretion is given to member states on the basis of their ob-
ligation to adopt environmental (implementation) plans and programmes (possibly 
linked to certain priority pollutants or other types of priorities), setting out specific 
policy lines and further measures – as in the framework directives on waste (art. 7), 
 
59 See Council resolution on the drafting, implementation and enforcement of Community envi-
ronmental law, (1997) OJ C 321/1. 
60 See Directive 2000/60, (2000) OJ L 327/1.  
61 Directive 96/62 on ambient air quality assessment and management, (1996) OJ L 296/55. 
62 Directive 91/156, (1991) OJ L 78/32. 
63 Primarily saying that if the factual quality is better than what the directive requires, the fac-
tual quality becomes the standard (see for instance art. 11, § 6 of the Water framework di-
rective).  
64 See art. 4 of the ‘Air framework directive’. 
65 See arts. 10(3) and 11(4) of the ‘Water framework directive’, and also Case C-138/98, Fornasar, 
in relation to art. 18 of the ‘Waste framework directive’. Furthermore, the ‘Waste framework-
directive’ offers general rules on (categories of) waste but goes on (see arts. 3-5) to require 
member states to introduce (additional) measures on prevention, reduction and recovery of 
waste (and, although not strictly within a framework directive, art. 14 of the Wild birds di-
rective). 
66 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 112. 
67 This is a type of harmonization that is only used if there is a strong link with the free move-
ment of goods, so especially when product standards are involved (as with the amount of ex-
haust fumes and the amount of noise produced by cars). 
68 See J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 118. 
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water (art. 11) and air pollution.69 Meanwhile, plans and programmes also appear 
outside framework directives, as in the Habitats Directive (the so-called manage-
ment plans for special conservation areas in art. 6). These instruments also include 
room for participation either by the general public or interested parties, which also 
strengthens the communicative element in environmental policy making. 
4.3. Interplay and Implementation 
In their analysis of new environmental policy instruments (nepis), Jordan et al. refer 
to five role models for European interplay, which are particularly relevant to policy 
transfer, especially transfer to ‘nepis’.70 Within the role model of the passive arena (1) 
innovation takes place without the involvement of EC-institutions, but simply by 
the diffusion of information and knowledge between member states with similar 
environmental problems and similar environmental law systems. The emulation of 
the German Eco-labelling system is mentioned as a typical example of this type of 
transfer. In the facilitating arena (2) we find a transfer between member states and be-
tween member states and the EC institutions, but now the diffusion is enhanced by 
the EC as a network of policy actors and processes. The sharing of ideas through the 
EC channels, such as when Dutch officials showcased their environmental planning 
views in the wake of the 5th EAP, is an important driving-force for innovation. In the 
harmonization arena (3) the objective of a Single European market (SEM) is the de-
termining factor behind innovative policy transfer. The effects of member states’ 
regulations on the SEM, as in the case of the German Packaging Waste Ordinance, 
can be an important motive to introduce new and Communitarian instruments and 
thus avoid (further) distortions. EC regulation represents a governance structure as 
a competitive arena (4) in which member states ‘compete for economic advantage and 
try to limit their regulatory adjustments costs’. Member states may want to remain 
ahead of EC regulation and influence both the EC environmental agenda and other 
member states in favour of adopting legislation which is similar to their own. The 
EMAS Directive (discussed below) offers the example of Great Britain and other 
member states promoting the adaptation of the ‘British scheme’ that was already in 
place in their jurisdictions. Finally, then, in the role model of the independent actor (5) 
we find the EC institutions, mainly the Commission, that adopt an entrepreneurial 
attitude in employing new initiatives either through the official decision-making 
procedures, as in emissions trading and energy taxation, or entering into voluntary 
agreements, as is the case with industry concerning fuel economy. 
It is particularly interesting to focus on the harmonization arena and to ask what 
room is left within that context for member states that whish to use new policy in-
struments as a means of implementing EC legislation. Considering the approach 
suggested in the previous section (§ 4.2), directives, especially framework directives, 
can explicitly provide room for member states’ regulatory initiatives. 
 
69 Art. 7(3) of the ‘Air framework directive’, for instance, stipulates that member states are to 
take the necessary steps to ensure compliance with limit values and also to establish action 
plans to abate the risks of exceeding thresholds. 
70 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 556-558. 
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Within the boundaries of implementing EC environmental law, however, the 
option of co- or even self-regulation seems to be excluded by the requirements of ar-
ticle 249 EC. In other words, the type of ‘horizontal’ legislation that the White Paper 
proposes is not an option for member states, unless either the EC so obliges, or a 
member state has recourse to article 176 EC.  
A first possibility would have been to implement a directive by referring to 
technical standards that are being produced by or in conjunction with the industry 
itself – like the ISO and CEN standards. Thus the ‘target groups’ themselves could 
be more strongly committed to the regulatory process. The problem here is that the-
se types of technical standards are not in themselves binding and often are pro-
posed merely as guidelines for ‘good environmental practice’; so it is up to whoever 
so wishes to apply them. From the case law of the Court of Justice we may conclude 
that this mode of implementation is only acceptable if the use of these standards is 
explicitly prescribed in legislation that is binding, because only then can citizens ex-
ert their rights.71  
Similarly the idea of implementation by environmental agreements would 
more closely involve major stakeholders. However, these types of agreements are 
arrived at voluntarily, between certain parties (most often administrative branches 
of government and sectors of industry), entailing that certain objectives should be 
met (or more often – only – aspired for) in relation to a certain activity, product or 
substance. These characteristics do not (sufficiently) match the transposition re-
quirements of being legally binding (also on third parties) and of full implementa-
tion (derived from art. 249 EC). Only if such an agreement would be referred to in 
binding legislation as being generally binding, could one imagine that this mode of 
transposition would be acceptable.72 Again, if the directive itself were to propagate 
this method of implementation it would be legally acceptable.73  
Meanwhile in 1996 the Commission issued a recommendation concerning en-
vironmental agreements implementing Community directives – which was matched 
in 1997 by a Council Resolution on the same subject.74 The bottom line is that both 
institutions wish to promote the use of these agreements and, to match that aspira-
tion, have laid down guidelines for the implementation of Community environmen-
tal directives by agreement. These guidelines consist of two sets of rules, one set of 
rules that should be complied with in all cases and one set of rules that should be 
complied with if appropriate. In the first – compulsory – list we find provisions on 
the enforcement, clarity and timeliness of objectives, publication, monitoring and 
reporting (to authorities and the general public), as well as openness (of the agree-
ment to other possible parties). In the second list – on ‘appropriateness’ – we find 
 
71 See for instance Case 361/88, 1991, I-2567 and C-59/89, 1991, I-2607 (TA-Luft). J.H. Jans, supra 
note 29, p. 144-145. 
72 Case 215/83, 1985 1055; J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 146-147. 
73 Directive 93/76 (1993) OJ L 237/28. To limit carbon dioxide emissions by improving energy 
efficiency (SAVE), art. 1: ‘Programmes can include laws, regulations, economic and adminis-
trative instruments, information, education and voluntary agreements whose impact can be 
objectively assessed.’ See also Case C-255/93 I-4949.  
74 Commission recommendation 96/733 (1996), OJ L 333/69 and Council Resolution of 7 Octo-
ber 1997, (1997) OJ C 321/6. The Commission also mentions European-wide agreements but 
is sceptic on that issue. 
Michiel A. Heldeweg 
 17 
clauses on ascertaining whether the aspired results are being reached, on the access 
of third parties to (in-company) information on the implementation of the agree-
ment, and finally on sanctions.  
Together with Jans we may conclude that if these requirements are met, there 
is indeed little difference between transposition through environmental agreements 
or through legally binding (unilateral) legislation. In his view, article 249 EC leaves 
little room for a more lenient approach to this matter – although, so far, we have no 
case law on the application of these guidelines.75 
Meanwhile, jumping ahead to the independent actor profile, we find that the 
Commission itself has also taken up initiatives on voluntary agreements at the 
Community level. In this it has ‘rallied’ support in the 5th EAP and in some of the 
member states’ criticism of the EC’s interventionalist instruments.76 By late 2001, 
however, only some 12 voluntary agreements had been adopted, such as on fuel 
economy with European and – later – with Japanese and Korean car manufacturers. 
Questions have been raised as to aspects of legitimacy, legality and transparency; 
especially considering that the Council and the European Parliament are kept out-
side the negotiations and that there is no specific legal basis for entering into these 
types of agreements in the EC Treaty. From the Commission’s standpoint however, 
voluntary agreements offer an interesting means to pursue its own objectives be-
yond the reach of (increased) parliamentary powers.77 Recently, however, the 
Commission has issued a Communication containing a new framework proposal on 
Community-level voluntary agreements as a means of co-regulation and self-
regulatory arrangement within legislative targets set by the EC.78 
Finally, returning to the member states’ level, the harmonization arena has taken 
its toll on some voluntary agreements by simply replacing them by EC legislation. 
Examples are the End-of-life Vehicles Directive (effectively rendering Austrian and 
German schemes void)79 and the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (replac-
ing an existing voluntary agreement in the Netherlands – although the directive it-
self has again been implemented through voluntary agreements!).80 
4.4. Exemplars 
Meanwhile, against the backdrop of these limitations, we do indeed witness the in-
troduction of less top-down regulations. A few examples are listed below.81 
The EC regulations on Eco-labelling82 and Eco-management and auditing 
(EMAS)83 present a communicative type of regulation, in which, although these 
 
75 J.H. Jans supra note 29, p. 148; Jans proposes even further requirements. 
76 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 566. 
77 Ibidem. 
78 Environmental agreements at the Community level within the framework of the action plan 
on the simplification and improvement of the regulatory environment, COM(2002) 412 final. 
79 Directive 2000/53, (2000) OJ L 269/34. 
80 Directive 94/62, (1994) OJ L 365/10. 
81 As voluntary agreements have already been discussed in above, they are not included within 
these examples. 
82 Regulation 880/1992, (1992) OJ L 099 (amended). 
83 Regulation 761/2001, (2001) OJ L 114/1.
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schemes are moulded in a directly binding format, participation takes place on a 
voluntary basis.  
The Eco-label award Regulation is based on the German example. The Com-
mission, in an entrepreneurial role, deemed it necessary to protect the SEM against 
a proliferation of similar schemes.84 The regulation is aimed at promoting, for con-
sumers, the option of purchasing products which are less harmful to the environ-
ment. By labelling, the consumer has more insight concerning the environmental 
benefits of that product. The label is attached to a product only if the environmental 
impact of a product is reduced in the course of its entire life cycle. A company can 
apply for the award of an eco-label to one (or more) of its products (arts. 6-7) – 
again, this is a completely voluntary decision. Each member state has a national au-
thority which is competent to judge whether or not a label can be awarded (arts. 7 
and 14). In deciding this authority is to apply the guidelines contained in the Regu-
lation.85 Awarding an eco-label entails that this authority enters into an agreement 
with the applicant on matters concerning the use of the label (art. 9).86 For the eco-
label scheme to become successful stakeholder support will be essential. The revi-
sion of the scheme in 200087 seems to have led to a somewhat greater acceptance 
(since 2001 the number of applications has risen by 150 percent).88 
The EMAS regulation is concerned with the voluntary participation of indus-
trial companies in an eco-management and audit scheme, designed to monitor and 
improve the environmental performance of a company and to offer information on 
the performance to the general public (art. 1). A company’s application will only be 
granted when it adopts an environmental eco-management system that incorpo-
rates (continuously updated) standards included in or set on the basis of the regula-
tion (art. 3). If all the criteria are voluntarily met, a competent national authority will 
register the company. Being registered (arts. 6-8) can be advantageous to companies 
mainly by virtue of a more favourable public image.  
Similarly, features of less top-down regulation can be found in sectoral (or ver-
tical) legislation. In stimulating the use of agreements and economic incentives the 
Nitrate Directive,89 for instance, requires member states to establish a ‘code of good 
agricultural practice’ which can serve as a basis for entering into (voluntary) agree-
ments with farmers. Directive 70/220 on air pollution caused by vehicles90 offers an 
interesting possibility of financial incentives for buying clean cars. Furthermore, Di-
rective 99/94 on consumer information on fuel economy and CO2 emissions sets out 
to improve information to the public on car performances.91 
A somewhat different innovative strand of regulations has been introduced in 
the field of tradable allowances.92 Regulation 2037/2000 on substances that deplete 
 
84 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 569. 
85 In part delegated to the Commission.  
86 The Commission has issued a standard agreement: Decision 2000/729, (2000) OJ L 293/20. 
87 Regulation 1980/2000, (2000) OJ L 237. 
88 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 570. 
89 Especially art. 4 of Directive 91/676, (1991) OJ L 375/1. 
90 (1970) OJ l76/1, amended by Directive 94/12, (1994) OJ L100. 
91 (2000) OJ L12/16. 
92 See J. Scott, supra note 32 and E. Woerdman, Implementing the Kyoto Mechanisms: Political Barri-
ers and Path Dependence, Ph.D. thesis at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands), 2002. 
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the ozone layer,93 implementing the Vienna Convention and Montreal protocol,94 
contains a system of trade through licences to import or export controlled substanc-
es from other countries (which may or may not be parties to the Montreal protocol). 
More important, and certainly more innovative, is the Directive establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community.95 
This scheme precedes the obligations under the first commitment period of the Kyo-
to protocol (2008-2012) and aims to prepare the Community for allowances trading. 
The possibility of allowances trading has two important advantages: 1) emission re-
duction will take place where it is most cost-efficient to do so. This in itself does not 
reduce the total emissions, but it does improve collective efficiency, to the benefit of 
all the permit holders; 2) the use of a trading system will minimize distortions in 
competition. Furthermore, one may argue that trading systems will be a stimulus to 
developing less pollutant production techniques.96 
To these examples we can add the carbon-energy tax. The Commission took 
up the initiative to introduce such a tax scheme in response to the studies on and 
the use of environmental taxes in member states such as Denmark and the Nether-
lands and also because of fears, from other member states, of (distortions in the 
SEM and) competitive impacts caused by national tax schemes.97 Although there 
was a positive momentum for an EC initiative, member states’ sovereign(ty) inter-
ests in conjunction with the unanimity requirement within the Council, made it 
very difficult to arrive at an agreement. A 1997 proposal proved unconvincing, but 
finally, in 2003, a framework directive was adopted.98 
Clearly, instruments of indirect and self-regulation are taken up at the member 
state level.99 In many countries we can find examples of new instruments, such as 
taxation,100 subsidies,101 tradable emission rights,102 gentlemen’s agreements103 and 
schemes for labelling, audits and management.104 Regardless of these examples, the 
previous enthusiasm over these types of arrangements has somewhat died down. 
 
93 (2000) OJ L 244/1. 
94 (1988) OJ L 297/10 (Vienna Convention) and (1988) OJ L 299/21 (Montreal Protocol). 
95 Directive 2003/87 (2003) OJ L 275. 
96 See also J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 1002. 
97 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 565-566. 
98 Directive 2003/96, (2003) OJ L 283/51. 
99 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 570. 
100 See ECO, Product, Fuel and Green taxes in Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Neth-
erlands; R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 17,  
p. 109, p. 219, p. 293 and p. 367.  
101 See the income tax system in Flanders (Belgium) and the German subsidies (in connection 
with agreements on reduction-targets); R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere 
(eds.), supra note 8, p. 54-55 and p. 220. 
102 These are difficult to find on a member state level. There certainly are (or have been) discus-
sions on this matter, but no implementation – apart from tradable rights in the agricultural 
area.  
103 Like in Flanders (on waste policy), in Denmark (with a general legal basis in the Environmen-
tal Protection Act!) and in Germany (both on a private and public law basis), R.J.G.H. 
Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 52, 108 and 222.  
104 For instance in Flanders, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Spain; R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Hel-
deweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 52-53, p. 103, p. 260-261, p. 293 and  
p. 428. 
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Maybe initially the expectations were too optimistic. As was said concerning the 6th 
EAP, at this point in time the idea of completely moving away from direct regula-
tion and replacing the top-down model by strictly horizontal instruments is no 
longer considered viable or desirable. A more eclectic approach has seen the light of 
day, in which with each problem an optimal mix of instruments is sought.105 
4.5. Summing Up 
The objectives of sustainability and a high level of protection (art. B EU Treaty, arts. 
2 and 174(1) EC Treaty) are ambitious yet operationally underdetermined. Much is 
to be gained but very little is ensured. What can effectively be achieved lies in the 
wake of the willingness of all concerned to consider environmental policy making 
as a joint venture. An important question is how the effectiveness of environmental 
legal policies can be improved in the context of the EC framework. How much room 
can and indeed should be given to the implementation of EC legislation by private 
guidelines, environmental agreements and environmental management systems? 
Or, for that matter, what room should be left for autonomous legislation by member 
states?  
Given the focus of this contribution, the principle of effectiveness is especially 
relevant to the attempts to make more use of horizontal instruments (instead of top-
down or vertical ones). On that note clearly the IPPC Directive (discussed under § 
3.2) offers something of a disappointment. The main instruments in this Directive 
are permits and general emission standards. Although the Directive is geared to-
wards creating more integration, it nevertheless does not satisfy the promises in-
cluded in the preceding 5th EAP Programme. Possibly the more ‘balanced approach’ 
of the 6th EAP found its predecessor in the IPPC Directive.  
Having said this, we find that there are also many regulatory initiatives that 
do seem to fit with the EAP’s call for ‘partnerships’. The aforementioned EMAS and 
Eco-labelling regulations clearly signify this. Furthermore, we have seen that the 
concepts of framework directives (such as for water, air and waste), (interactive) 
planning and programming, using minimum instead of total harmonization, are 
clearly present. When we look at the initiatives on the member state level, we also 
find that there are many examples of regulatory initiatives within the realm of indi-
rect and self-regulation, especially taxation, subsidies, environmental agreements 
(sometimes even on a statutory basis), environmental management schemes and 
voluntary codes of conduct (good practice). 
5. Accountability 
Taking responsibility and explaining actions are the key elements of the principle of 
accountability. In the context of Environmental Law comments will be limited to two 
issues, mainly in view of what is still to be discussed under § 6 on openness and 
participation. The first issue to be commented upon (under § 5.1) is environmental 
principles, taking the viewpoint that it takes a substantive ‘benchmark’ before 
 
105 See also B. Rittberger and J. Richarson, supra note 27, p. 603. 
Michiel A. Heldeweg 
 21 
transgressors can be truly held to be accountable. The second issue for comment 
(under § 5.2) is internal EC decision-making procedures in environmental law. 
5.1. Principles 
The second paragraph of article 174 EC presents a number of principles of European 
environmental policy: 1) a high level of protection; 2) the precautionary principle; 3) 
the prevention principle; 4) the source principle; 5) the polluter pays principle; 6) 
the safeguard clause. One could well argue that these principles offer standards for 
accountability, but one should be aware of two important aspects. First of all, these 
principles meet a general characteristic of principles in that they are intrinsically 
vague. This means that it takes case law and, possibly, further guidelines to deter-
mine their more precise content and to be able to truly apply them as benchmarks. 
Secondly, the question remains whether and, if so, to what extent courts are willing 
to use these principles as legal criteria. As such we should distinguish between di-
rect use, such as rules of conduct, and indirect use, such as guidelines for the inter-
pretation of other substantive or procedural regulations (take, for instance, the 
relationship between the burden of proof and the precautionary principle). When 
applied directly we should consider that when discretionary competences lie at the 
heart of the legal dispute, this may give rise to a more marginal test as to whether 
certain principles have been adhered to. 
The principles of ‘a high level of protection’, ‘precaution’ and ‘prevention’, of-
fer interesting examples of the above.  
The principle of attaining a high level of protection is typically a principle that en-
tails so much discretion that it is questionable whether it could indeed be consid-
ered a legal principle – or rather a political objective. Apart from the fact that the 
section includes the words ‘seek to achieve a high level…’, a ‘high level of protection’ 
is not to say ‘the highest level of protection’; there is still room for weighing inter-
ests, amongst which are possibly the diversity of situations in the various regions of 
the Community. Amongst the institutions of the EC, however, the principle offers 
an argumentative basis in the political debate.106 
Secondly, the precautionary principle is relevant as it requires proper account 
to be taken of available scientific and technical data (as required by art. 174, § 3 EC) 
and it also determines that even indicative or tentative scientific data may suffice as 
a basis for taking protective measures.107 Absolute scientific certainty (even if it were 
to exist) is not a prerequisite for introducing restrictive measures: ‘in dubio pro natu-
ra’. The precautionary principle also applies to the IPPC Directive in determining 
the ‘best available techniques’, when considering the possible risks involved.108 We 
also find the precautionary principle being applied in examples of secondary legis-
lation, especially in aiding the interpretation of relevant provisions.109 
 
106 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 32. 
107 See J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 33-34. 
108 See Annex IV of Directive 96/61, (1996) OJ L 257/26. 
109 For instance, case C-180/96, United Kingdom v. Commission [1998] ECR I-2265.  
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Thirdly, the prevention principle was an important subject in the 3rd EAP.110 It 
was stressed in this programme that the improvement of information and 
knowledge, as well as the diffusion thereof amongst decision-makers, interested 
parties and the public as a whole(!) is of the utmost importance. All relevant infor-
mation should be considered in the earliest possible stage in the decision-making 
process. The Directive on the freedom of access to information on the environ-
ment,111 which will be discussed below, is an important outcome of this line of rea-
soning. The same can be said of the Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA – also to be discussed below).112 The preventive principle contributed to the 
understanding that, alongside to direct measures to further the environmental cause, 
article 174 EC also underpins indirect measures, such as freedom of access to infor-
mation, the shaping of the environmental decision-making process (as in the EIA 
and IPPC Directives), and EMAS and Eco-labelling regulations. As I will go on to 
show below (in § 6) this acknowledgement is an important step towards good envi-
ronmental governance.  
It should be well understood that the environmental principles are only direct-
ly binding on EC institutions and that these often involve considerable discretion.113 
Again, though, the courts may use these principles as guidelines in interpreting sec-
ondary EC legislation and, sometimes, in judging specific member states’ autono-
mous measures.114 
Especially in member states with General Environmental Law Codes (such as 
in Denmark, Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands), or drafts to that end (such as in 
Germany and Italy), we find environmental principles being codified (or proposals 
to do so). In Spain a reference to such principles is even included in the Constitu-
tion, with an explicit link to the principles of article 174 EC. In most cases there is a 
strong similarity between the EC principles and the ‘state principles’. Generally 
speaking, these state principles are considered to be mere guidelines for policy mak-
ing, rather than legal principles of a kind similar to principles of natural justice. It is 
expected, though, that these principles will have an indirect legal effect such, as for 
instance, through the process of interpreting existing regulations.115 
Whether or not environmental principles should or should not extend to a 
right to a clean or healthy environment is a matter taken up in § 7. 
5.2. Procedures 
From a legal point of view procedures represent the fabric of the competences and 
responsibilities of the institutions involved. Let us then turn to these procedures 
 
110 (1983) OJ C 46/1. 
111 Directive 90/313, (1990) OJ L 158/56. 
112 Directive 85/337, (1985) OJ L 175/40 (amended). 
113 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 21-22; G. van Calster, supra note 29, p. 477. 
114 On the binding effect for member states, see G. Winter, ‘Environmental Principles and Com-
munity Law’, in J.H. Jans (ed.), The European Convention and the Future of European Environ-
mental Law, Proceedings of the Avosetta Group of European Environmental Lawyers, Groningen, 
Europa Law Publishing, 2003, p. 3-25. Compare as an example also the Walloon Waste case, 
Case C-2/90 Commission v. Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431. 
115 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 567-568. 
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first. In the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) it was decided that decisions under the Title 
(then VII) on the Environment116 could be taken by a qualified majority. An excep-
tion – still – applies to a number of specific policy areas as mentioned under the se-
cond paragraph of article 175 EC, amongst which are fiscal provisions, town and 
country planning measures and the management of water resources, as well as 
measures affecting the member state’s choice between energy sources. In those cases 
the Council can only decide unanimously, unless it is unanimously decided by the 
Council that on a certain matter within the scope of these exempted areas a decision 
will be taken with a qualified majority.  
Given the close relationship between environmental protection and improve-
ment, on the one hand, and town and country planning, on the other, this can be 
considered as a barrier to integrated and comprehensive policy making.117 Apart 
from the question whether the Community has the power to pursue a solitary town 
and country planning policy, it will be clear that in many cases environmental poli-
cies will have a certain effect in this type of planning, such as in protecting flora and 
fauna, or in the use of zoning for reasons of air pollution or the hazard of major ac-
cidents.118 This also applies to environmental impact assessment, where some deci-
sions for which an assessment is to be made concern town or country planning.119 In 
practice, however, in the latter two cases the majority-rule procedure was indeed 
applied.120 As for introducing environmental taxes, as stated under § 4.4, the una-
nimity rule and sovereign(ty) considerations clearly pose an obstacle for the intro-
duction of new, economic environmental instruments of this type. 
In the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam it was decided that (almost) all of the EC en-
vironmental legislation is to be prepared in accordance with the co-decision proce-
dure (of art. 251 EC), thus ensuring a veto for the European Parliament (EP).121 This 
procedure also applies to the setting of EAPs, as article 175(3) EC stipulates. We 
have to consider that co-decision does not necessarily lead to more stringent envi-
ronmental policies, but it will certainly strengthen the legitimacy of these policies. 
The position of the EP will strengthen and with that the parliament will also be held 
more accountable by civil society. According to some, the applicability of article 
175(3) EC on adopting EAPs makes these (future) EAPs legally binding.122 
On the issue of accountability, however, we should be well aware that many 
environmental standards are set in what is called the ‘comitology procedure’. This 
applies especially to technical standards for which the regulatory procedure is ‘del-
egated’. The legal basis for this practice can be found in article 202, third indent EC 
Treaty. The Council has imposed certain requirements in the exercise of this compe-
tence. It has done so in a separate Comitology Decision,123 laying out the basic rules 
 
116 At that moment art. 130R-T EC. 
117 As dealt with under Coherence; § 3. 
118 Seveso-II Directive 96/82, (1997) OJ L 10/13. 
119 See annex II (under 10) to directive 85/337 as amended by Directive 97/11, (1997) OJ L 073/5. 
Also (art. 3 under 2a of) Directive 01/42, (2001) OJ L 197/30. 
120 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 46-47. 
121 G. van Calster, supra note 29, p. 9; J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 9. 
122 See the considerations under § 4.1. 
123 Second Comitology Decision 1999/468, (1999) OJ L 184/23 (repealing the First Comitology 
Decision 1987/373, (1987) OJ L 197.  
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and principles for this procedure (or in fact procedures – as there are four types). 
The Council can set more specific requirements in the specific case where powers to 
implement are conferred on the Commission.124 Presently the general rules on deci-
sion making in the Comitology procedure(s) are under revision.125 The comitology 
procedure is ‘activated’ through a clause in a specific directive. On the basis of that 
clause a representative of the Commission submits a draft proposal on certain tech-
nical standards to a committee. The committee subsequently offers an opinion. If 
the final proposal is in accordance with the committee’s opinion then the Commis-
sion can adopt the standards; if there is discrepancy the Commission sends the pro-
posal to the Council which can take a final decision on the basis of majority voting, 
within a certain time-limit (if this limit is exceeded the Commission decides). An ex-
ample of this comitology procedure can be found in the framework directive on 
waste.126 
5.3. Summing Up 
Environmental principles can be regarded as ‘benchmarks’ for accountability in en-
vironmental policy making. Mainly through the role of the Courts, even though the 
legal test will often be a marginal one, this type of benchmarking will play an in-
creasingly more important role. Gradually, environmental principles are also being 
introduced on the member state level, by and large consistent with EC principles. It 
still remains to be seen whether these ‘stately principles’ will become relevant to le-
gal accountability, but the first step seems to have been taken. 
Voting by qualified majority and applying the co-decision procedure are im-
portant tools for increased accountability – especially in view of the role of the EP.127 
Accountability can, however, be in question when ‘comitology’ creeps in. In part 
this will be unavoidable (especially with technical standards for products), but it 
does increase the possibility of bureaucratic policy making (and shutting out civil 
society). The alternative of leaving further regulation to lower public authorities or 
to voluntary schemes should be taken firmly into consideration. One should also 
consider that in leaving (more) room for member states to maintain and introduce 
more stringent measures and to apply instruments of a more ‘horizontal and co-
regulatory’ nature their involvement can be strengthened and thus their accounta-
bility (in the sense of legitimacy). This would also match the fact that the 6th EAP 
clearly stipulates that accountability is a principle which is relevant to all sections of 
the Community, that is to say, both on a supranational and on the member state 
 
124 See also Case C-378/00 Commission v. Council and EP. 
125 See, amongst other sources: Report from the Commission, on the working of committees in 
2002, COM(2003) 530 final. See also J.H. Jans, ‘EU Environmental Policy and the Civil Socie-
ty’, in J.H. Jans (ed.), The European Convention and the Future of European Environmental Law, 
Proceedings of the Avosetta Group of European Environmental Lawyers, Groningen, Europa Law 
Publishing, 2003, p. 55-66, especially p. 61-62. 
126 See art. 1(a) and art. 18 of Directive 91/156, (1991) OJ L 78/32 (amendment of 75/442, (1975) 
OJ L 194/47).  
127 To say that this will enhance the legitimacy of the outcome is still somewhat optimistic in my 
view, but this procedure is far preferable to other existing ones. 
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level. Accountability also implies taking responsibility – making use of the possibili-
ties to enter into more horizontal forms of regulation.  
6. Openness and Participation 
As stated above, in the light of the prevention principle (under 5a), the objectives as 
listed in the first paragraph of article 174 EC not only allow for direct measures to 
further the environmental cause, but also for indirect measures such as the freedom 
of access to information,128 the shaping of the environmental decision making-
process, as in the case of the EIA and IPPC Directives,129 as well as in the case of the 
regulation on Eco-audits and on EEA.130  
Both in the area of openness and participation, clearly the importance of en-
suring proper decision making (especially concerning fact-finding and assessment) 
as well as the general availability of environmental information, and also public 
participation throughout the policy chain, has been recognized as a major legal cor-
nerstone of environmental law in Europe. Not only as a means to further the legiti-
macy of vertical legislation (by ensuring better involvement),131 but also as a means 
of making citizens and civil institutions more sensitive to environmental processes. 
Thus the internalization of environmental effects in behavioural patterns has a bet-
ter opportunity, especially as the diffusion of information is supported by the new 
types of environmental instruments (as discussed above).132 The Arhus Conven-
tion133 is an important UN document, to which the EC is a signatory that underpins 
three basic legal requirements in the area of openness and participation: a) access to 
environmental information; b) public participation; c) access to judicial review in 
environmental cases. Each of these requirements, also referred to as the three 
‘Arhus pillars’, has given rise to legislation or proposals thereon. The main exam-
ples of these are listed below. 
6.1. Impact Assessment 
Historically, one of the first initiatives to further access to environmental infor-
mation is the Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment. The first EIA Di-
rective was implemented in 1985 and since then several amendments have 
followed.134 The EIA Directive requires the member states to introduce a procedure 
in their national legal system so that projects that are likely to have a significant ef-
 
128 Supra, n. 3. 
129 Supra, n. 4 and n. 5. 
130 (1993) OJ L 168/1 and (1990) OJ L 120/1. 
131 J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 999. 
132 See also D.J. Fiorino, ‘Rethinking environmental regulation: perspectives on law and govern-
ance’, 23 Harvard Environmental Law Review, 1999, p. 441-469, especially p. 465-466. 
133 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters, signed by the EC on the 25th of June 1998; COM(1998) 344 
final. 
134 Directive 85/337, (1985) OJ L 175/40, with a major amendment by Directive 97/11, (1997) OJ 
L 73/14. A more recent amendment was made in view of improving access to justice: Di-
rective 2003/35, (2003) OJ L 156. 
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fect on the environment are subjected to an assessment of these effects before con-
sent is given for the project. The impact assessment is to include at least the follow-
ing: a description of the project and of measures envisaged to avoid, reduce and 
remedy environmental effects; data required to identify and assess the main effects; 
an outline of the main alternatives to the project and a non-technical summary for 
the public. Openness and participation are cornerstones of the EIA Directives. Not 
only on an intra-member state level but, in the light of the Espoo Convention on 
transboundary environmental effects,135 also for authorities and the general public 
in other member states; they have an equal right to be informed and to (have a suf-
ficient opportunity to) participate. 
Earlier, reference was made to the Directive on strategic environmental as-
sessment (SEA) which requires an impact assessment of plans or programmes likely 
to have significant effects on the environment (arts. 2-4). This assessment is to take 
place during the preparation of these plans or programmes and should result in a 
report which studies the environmental effects of these proposals and ‘reasonable 
alternatives’ thereto (art. 5). The Directive also provides for continued monitoring of 
the implementation of these plans or programmes in order to, if necessary, under-
take remedial action (arts. 10 and 12). 
6.1.1 Public Access to Environmental Information 
Openness was also the key element in the 1990 Directive on freedom to access in-
formation on the environment.136 It set out to ensure the freedom of access for any 
natural or legal person, even without having to prove an interest, to information on 
the environment held by any public authority, also in a transboundary respect – 
given the non-discrimination principle of article 12 EC and the fact that the Di-
rective aimed to guarantee free access to any person ‘throughout the Communi-
ty’.137 In 2003 this Directive was repealed and replaced by a new directive on Public 
access to environmental information.138 This replacement was considered necessary 
in order to clarify and expand the definitions of ‘environmental information’ and 
‘public authorities’ (which, in view of art. 6 EC, does not only include authorities 
with explicit environmental competences), and also to emphasize that the directive 
purports to establish a right to information and that a refusal to disclose information 
only exists in specific and clearly defined cases. 
Article 2 of this Directive offers a broad description of what may be considered 
to be ‘information relating to the environment’: information on the state of the ele-
ments of the environment; factors (possibly) affecting these elements, measures 
(possibly) affecting these elements; an analysis of these measures; reports on the 
implementation of environmental legislation; the state of human health and safety, 
the conditions of human life; cultural sites and built structures in as much they are 
or may be affected by these elements or these factors or measures. Only in a limited 
number of cases can access be denied (art. 4), such as in the case of information that 
 
135 Bulletin EC 1/2-1991 (26 February 1991). 
136 Directive 90/313, (1990) OJ L 158/56 (repealed!). 
137 J.H. Jans, supra note 29, p. 333. 
138 See n. 3. 
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affects national defence or public security (§ 2b), which are matters sub judice (§ 2c) 
and information which is confidential for (overriding) commercial or industrial rea-
sons (§ 2d). From the wording of article 4(1): the ‘member states may provide for a re-
quest to be refused if [….]’ it follows that member states may decide to pursue a 
more restrictive policy on the non-disclosure of environmental information. With 
respect to enforcing the Directive, its article 6 states that any applicant (that is to say 
any natural or legal person) whose request to access certain information has been 
refused, has a right to judicial or administrative review by an independent and im-
partial authority under the national legal system. Furthermore, one should note that 
the Directive also has stipulations, in article 7, concerning the duty to actively pro-
vide information to the general public, by means such as a periodic publication of 
‘the state of the environment’. 
Apart from this general – horizontal – Directive on the right of access to in-
formation, there are many other Directives (like on packaging and packaging waste, 
on major accidents and on habitats)139 and also regulations (like on eco-labelling and 
on the import and export of dangerous chemicals)140 that contain information re-
quirements.  
6.2. European Environment Agency 
Taking the requirements from first pillar of the Arhus Convention one step further, 
the Regulation on the establishment of the European Environment Agency (EEA) 
tasks the EEA with providing the Community and its member states with environ-
mental information which provides a basis for further environmental policy mak-
ing. The information emanating from the EEA can also be brought to the attention 
of the general public. The information is not limited to the present ‘state of the envi-
ronment’ but also concerns scientific research into the foreseeable future. The EPA is 
to give priority to environmental matters of a transboundary, pluri-national and 
global character. The agency has no competence to pursue its own inspections in the 
member states nor does it have any regulatory capacities. 
6.3. IPPC; Participation, Access to Justice and NGOs 
Bridging openness, participation and judicial review, the Directive on Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) contains provisions on each of these as-
pects – especially after the adoption of the (amendments by the) Directive on Public 
Participation etc.141 Articles 15 to 17 (now) contain provisions on (improved) access 
to information and public participation, as well as (newly introduced) provisions on 
access to justice. 
 
139 Packaging, art. 6, section 4, see n. 68; Major Accidents, art. 13 of Directive 96/82, (1997) OJ L 
010/13; habitats, art. 17 of Directive 92/43, (1992) OJ L 206/7. 
140 Labelling, arts. 5, 8 and 10, and annex IV of Regulation 1980/2000, (2000) OJ L 237/1; Im-
port/export, arts. 4 and 9 of Regulation 2455/92, (1992) OJ L 251/13 (amended). 
141 Directive 2003/35 on Public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and 
programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation 
and access to justice directives 85/337 and 96/61; (2003) OJ L 156. 
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The Directive on Public Participation also purports to enhance participation in 
a more general sense, at least in the context of plans and programmes relating to the 
environment (following up on art. 6 of the Arhus Convention). Private persons, but 
also associations, organizations and groups, in particular NGOs promoting envi-
ronmental protection, have the right to an early and effective opportunity to partic-
ipate in a decision-making procedure on the preparation, modification or review of 
certain plans and programmes (listed in a separate Annex) and the public is entitled 
to express comments and opinions, when all options are still open before decisions 
on the plans and programmes are made – article 2(3). The Directive also (in art. 3) 
amends the EIA Directive in view of the provisions on access to information, partic-
ipation, but also on judicial review.  
The aspect of access to justice is the main subject of a Commission proposal for 
a directive on access to justice in environmental matters, aimed at implementing the 
third pillar of the Arhus Convention.142 Although this proposal is based on article 
175 EC the avoidance of disparities is also an important motive: enforcement of En-
vironmental Law depends on many factors; lack of enforcement is too frequently 
due to the limitations in the legal standing of persons directly affected as well as of 
representative associations seeking to protect the environment.143 The proposal fo-
cuses on the legal acts of public authorities under or obliged by Environmental 
Law.144 According to article 6 natural or legal persons145 can apply for an internal 
review by a public authority to reconsider such an act (or the omission thereof). If 
this authority fails to meet the time-limits for deciding upon such a request or the 
applicant considers the decision taken not to be in compliance with environmental 
law, he or she is entitled to institute ‘environmental proceedings’ (art. 7). These can 
take the form of administrative or judicial review procedures, both on procedural 
and substantive issues, before an independent and impartial body established by 
law, in order to challenge these acts or omissions on the ground of a breach of envi-
ronmental law. As for legal standing, article 4 points to the need for a ‘sufficient in-
terest’, or impairment of a right, where the administrative procedural law (of the 
member state involved) requires this as a precondition.  
Especially interesting are the provisions for so-called ‘qualified entities’. In ar-
ticle 2(1-c) these are defined as associations, organizations and groups which have 
the objective of protecting the environment and are recognized as such. Article 8 
lists the criteria for the recognition of international, national, regional or local asso-
ciations, organizations or groups. Such an entity: a) must be independent, non-
profit-making legal persons with a statutory objective to protect the environment; b) 
must have an organizational structure which enables it to ensure the adequate pur-
suit of its statutory objective; c) must be legally constituted and must have worked 
actively for environmental protection in conformity with its statute for a period set 
by the member state in question (not in excess of 3 years); d) must have its annual 
statement of accounts certified by a registered auditor. Finally, article 9 obliges 
 
142 COM(2003) 624 final. 
143 Ibidem, General considerations, § 1.1. 
144 A term defined in art. 2(1-g). The possibility of judicial action taken against private persons is 
also addressed; see art. 3 – connecting the proposal to art. 9(3) of the Arhus Convention. 
145 Art. 2(1-b). 
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member states to establish a procedure for recognition, either on a ‘case to case ba-
sis’ or a ‘recognition in advance’ procedure. A qualified entity has legal standing in 
environmental proceedings without having to meet the requirements of article 4, 
when the matter is covered by the statutory activities and the review falls within the 
geographical area of the activities of the entity.146 
Ensuring legal standing for NGOs can be regarded as an ‘ultimate safeguard’. 
Ultimate in the sense that it is the general view, also shared by the Commission,147 
that participation in the decision-making process by these types of organizations is of 
the utmost importance to civil society and the democratic process.148 For that reason 
the Commission is involved in funding Environmental NGOs (also known as EN-
GOs) for environmental purposes.149 A special website lists each year’s contributions 
for which ENGOs have applied.150 Meanwhile the eight largest ENGOs in the EU, 
also known as the ‘Green G8’, have become important players in European envi-
ronmental policy making.151 
6.4. The Member States Perspective 
Under § 4.2 we observed that under the framework directives such as on waste, wa-
ter and air pollution the regulatory discretion of member states is included in their 
obligation to establish environmental (implementation) plans and programmes. 
Similar plans and programmes appear outside framework directives, such as in the 
Habitats Directive (for special conservation areas). These plans and programmes of-
ten include room for participation either by the general public or particular interest-
ed parties. Thus they can add to the element of a more communicative basis for 
environmental policy making. 
Public participation is most clearly present in the environmental permit sys-
tems of the member states. This coincides with the objectives of the IPPC Directive, 
but also with the Arhus Convention, which is already being implemented in the 
member states. Some member states have gone as far as to allow each member of 
the public to participate, regardless of his or her own private interest (the actio popu-
laris), even though this is not required under the Arhus Convention.152 In some 
countries public participation extends to other instruments, such as the plans and 
 
146 See art. 5(1). 
147 COM(2000) 11 final, Discussion paper: The Commission and Non-Governmental Organizations: 
Building a stronger partnership. 
148 See also J.H. Jans, supra note 114, p. 55. 
149 See J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 1000. See also: <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environ 
ment/funding/finansup.htm> (dd. 24/02/2003); on the basis of Decision No. 466/2002/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 1 March 2002 laying down a Community 
action programme promoting non-governmental organizations primarily active in the field of 
environmental protection. 
150 See <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/environment/funding/ngo/2003/list03_en. 
htm>. 
151 See J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 999. See also <http://www.eeb.org/press/Green_G8_on_ 
Convention_29_04_02.pdf> and for active participation: <http://www.eeb.org/press/ 
Green_G8_on_Convention_29_04_02.pdf>. 
152 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 573. 
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programmes mentioned earlier,153 but also to procedures in which an EIA is to be 
made. The EIA has clearly become an important policy instrument in the member 
states.154 
As far as the implementation of the provisions on judicial review in the Arhus 
Convention is concerned, one can conclude that most member states have adminis-
trative courts that deal with administrative decisions and in some member states 
appeals against these types of decisions must be brought before the ordinary courts 
(like in Ireland, the UK and Denmark).155 By and large review takes place in con-
formity with article 6 ECHR. It is also important to notice that, increasingly, oppor-
tunities for NGOs to appeal in a court of law are being enlarged, especially with 
regard to the general environmental interest.156 
6.5. Summing Up 
Considering the Directives on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), on Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA), on Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
(IPPC), on Public access to environmental information, on Public participation, the 
proposal on Access to justice in environmental matters, as well as the regulations on 
the EEA, on Eco-labelling and on Eco-management (EMAS), we can conclude that 
the good governance principles of openness and participation have clearly been 
brought to the foreground of environmental policy making. This observation is 
supported by many examples of clauses and provisions on openness and participa-
tion in sectoral (or vertical) directives and regulations (such as on habitats and on 
packaging, to name just two examples). 
Both principles are also clearly present in the environmental law systems of 
member states. Although there are many practical differences – for instance as to 
who has sufficient standing to actually participate in a procedure; nevertheless the 
basic notions from the Arhus Convention are generally adhered to in national envi-
ronmental law. 
Finally, according to the 5th EAP, openness and participation underpin the no-
tion of environmental protection as a ‘shared responsibility’. Furthermore, the 6th 
EAP states that to ‘Work closely with business and consumers to identify solutions’ 
and to ‘Ensure better and more accessible information on the environment for citi-
zens’ remain the focal points in the strategic view on environmental policy making. 
7. A Governance Shift under the New Constitution? 
The White Paper’s principles of good governance, as viewed in the ‘World Bank’ 
perspective on governance, match both the cornerstones of environmental legal pol-
 
153 See, for instance, Austria, in R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), su-
pra note 8, p. 16 . 
154 Clearly also by virtue of the EC EIA directive (discussed above). 
155 R.J.G.H. Seerden, M.A. Heldeweg and K. Deketelaere (eds.), supra note 8, p. 577 and: Germa-
ny, p. 238; the Netherlands, p. 379; the UK, p. 462-463. 
156 Ibidem, p. 581 and: France, p. 192; Italy, p. 309; the Netherlands, 387-388; Spain, 435; the UK, 
p. 462-463. J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 1001. 
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icy making and the present-day legal policy practice in environmental law in Eu-
rope. The conviction that environmental protection is a shared responsibility and 
that environmental policies require a ‘joint venture’ between government and civil 
society is sufficiently rooted in the basic legal notions of environmental law to allow 
for a fruitful, reciprocal relationship. 
7.1. Following or Setting a Trend? 
So, looking back at the last ten years of environmental policy making (from the 5th 
EAP onwards), we find principles of good governance implicitly present in envi-
ronmental legal policy making in some form or another, even before the White Pa-
per was presented. Rather than following a trend it seems that environmental legal 
policy making has, probably amongst other sectors, been a trend-setter; both in gen-
eral strategies and in actual legal policy implementation. That is not to say that the 
presentation of principles of good governance by the Commission in the White Pa-
per is just ‘old news’ as far as the environmental sector is concerned. The White Pa-
per lists the principles with respect to its objective of a closer relationship between 
civil society and public authorities on all levels of and within the Community. Sure-
ly this confirms and indeed underpins the present strategic view on environmental 
legal policy making. Thus the White Paper can serve to strengthen the attempts at a 
greater use of ‘horizontal instruments’, that is of closer co-operation with civil socie-
ty and of instruments that call for a greater internalization of the environmental di-
mensions for all kinds of decisions, both within the public and the private realm.  
Having said this, we may ask ourselves whether the notion of good environ-
mental governance, as it stands today, offers a true shift in governance. When the 
Commission states that it aims to ‘refocus the institutions’, this is to be understood 
as a ‘Better use of powers [...]’, which is to ‘connect the EU more closely to its citi-
zens and lead to more effective policies’.157 This agenda can be pursued without any 
fundamental institutional changes, especially when we merely look at openness and 
participation. On the other hand, when we focus on the element of ‘more effective 
policies’, the White Paper can support the sectoral pressure for new environmental 
policy instruments, and indeed for a true governance shift. 
7.2. Barriers to a Shift in Governance 
Such a shift, however, is hampered by a number of factors, especially by the institu-
tional demands of a Single European Market (SEM) and respect for member state 
sovereignty. 
As to the sovereignty issue, especially when financial instruments are in-
volved, this can be a sensitive point. In the earlier mentioned example of environ-
mental taxation (in § 4.4) this is illustrated as article 175(2) EC requires a unanimous 
decision in the Council in a number of issues, amongst which is taxation. For this 
type of economic instrument to be used more frequently, the decision-making pro-
 
157 White Paper, p. 33 and p. 8. 
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cess is an important barrier.158 Naturally this would not be the case if member states 
would more readily agree to use majority rule. So far that does not seem to be the 
case, as is also illustrated by the fact that under the draft proposal for a European 
Constitution the same unanimity rule applies – much to the regret of, for instance, 
the Green G8.159 Rittberger and Richardson160 also show how, especially – but not 
only – when the unanimity rule applies, the Commission is forced to apply a strate-
gy in which much less ambitious proposals are brought forward than the Commis-
sion itself would probably like (considering what the Commission has presented on 
new environmental policy instruments in the 5th and 6th EAPs). 
Interestingly enough the issue of sovereignty can also operate as an incentive 
to harmonization in environmental law. The Carbon energy tax, mentioned under § 
4.4, is also an example of this, as the Commission’s initiative was (also) motivated 
by fears from some member states of competitive disadvantages caused by national 
tax schemes.161 Again, though, to take the initiative is one thing, but to reach agree-
ment was – by the same token of sovereignty – quite another. The question which 
remains is whether in the final analysis the unified tax system offers as much envi-
ronmental promise as national schemes did or would have done. The same question 
arises in view of voluntary agreements. In Germany (EMAS) and in the Netherlands 
(packaging) voluntary schemes were in operation but were pushed aside by harmo-
nization motivated (mainly) by competitive fears.162 
Finally, as we saw, member states’ sovereignty offers little opportunity to in-
troduce new environmental policy instruments as a means of implementing of di-
rectives, unless the directive allows for such discretion.163 
On the issue of the SEM, again we find major barriers to introducing new en-
vironmental policy instruments. Prior to the 1987 Single European Act, though, 
striving for an SEM was indeed an important drive for environmental legislation. 
Clearly the use of command and control legislation prevailed, however, as this was 
best suited to economic harmonization.164 Around 1992 the economic recession that 
hit Europe together with the battle for greater European legitimacy (in the aftermath 
of the Maastricht Treaty) urged the Commission to seek new instruments, especially 
in the environmental policy area, that could improve policy efficiency, implementa-
tion and greater cost-effectiveness.165 The general belief seemed to be that in order to 
cope with the needs of greater economic growth (in an SEM), the old environmental 
policy instruments would not suffice166 and only through shared responsibility, 
with greater stakeholder involvement, could economic and environmental needs be 
united.  
 
158 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 565-566 and p. 571. 
159 See proposal no. 3 in their Statement on the Future of Europe (on the 29th of April 2002) 
<http://www.eeb.org/press/Green_G8_on_Convention_29_04_02.pdf>. 
160 B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note 27, p. 597-601. 
161 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 565-566 and p. 671-572. 
162 Ibidem, p. 568 and p. 571. 
163 See § 4.3. 
164 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 560, p. 562 and p. 563-564.  
165 Ibidem, p. 564. 
166 B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note 27, p. 577-578. 
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Having said this, the negative reflex action to the SEM ideal accentuates the 
fear of economic distortions when competitive advantages cause disparities be-
tween member states. The prior illustrations of member states’ taxation schemes, 
Eco-labels and voluntary agreements with target groups present clear examples of 
where the Commission took on an entrepreneurial role to protect the SEM.167 
The introduction of the IPPC Directive presents an interesting case in view of 
the SEM argument. According to this Directive both quality and emission standards 
are to be set on the Community level, in order to be applied on the member state 
level, mainly by the process of permitting member states to set certain standards. 
However, in the explanatory memorandum to the original Commission proposal for 
the IPPC Directive, the leading concept was that, on the one hand, there would be 
harmonized quality standards (on the Community level) and, on the other, there 
would be differentiated emission limit values (within the member states). In a later 
stage of the preparations this proposition was abandoned and the directive now 
contains the following provision in article 18: ‘Acting on a proposal from the Com-
mission, the Council will set emission limit values, in accordance with the proce-
dures laid down in the Treaty, for [...] categories of installations listed in Annex I 
[…] and the polluting substances referred to in Annex III, for which the need for 
Community action has been identified.’  
Although the possibility of setting limit values by member states has not been 
entirely ruled out, clearly the directive sets a different tune from that advocated in 
the memorandum. This centralized allocation of regulatory power seems to be the 
result of a fear of distorting the internal market through the introduction of differen-
tiated emission values.168 
With Faure and Lefevere169 one may wonder why the IPPC framework has not 
capitalized on the notion of a higher allocative efficiency through leaving the com-
petences for emission limit values to the member states. Leaving room for differen-
tiated emission limit values offers an opportunity for a clustering of preferences and 
thus for competition between regulatory systems (and their legislative authori-
ties).170 If combined with the strict enforcement of quality standards set on the 
Community level, this approach can create efficiency without there being a fear of a 
‘race to the bottom’.171 Clearly this approach places the ideal of ‘a Europe for citi-
zens’, guaranteeing a similar environmental quality for all Europeans, before the ob-
jective of creating equal market conditions for all. In the proposed alternative these 
 
167 A. Jordan, R. Wurzel, A.R. Zito and L. Brückner, supra note 27, p. 572, conclude that the pro-
tection of the SEM continues to play a very important role in today’s environmental legisla-
tion. 
168 Compare the analysis as presented by: M.G. Faure and J.G.J. Lefevere, ‘Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control: an Economic Appraisal’, in Ch. Backes and G. Betlem (eds.), Integrat-
ed Pollution Prevention and Control, The EC Directive from a Comparative Legal and Economic Per-
spective, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 93-120. 
169 Ibidem. 
170 R. van den Bergh, ‘The subsidiarity Principle in European Community Law: Some Insights 
from Law and Economics’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 1994, p. 337-
366. Also C. Tiebout, ‘A pure Theory of Local Expenditures’, Journal of Political Economy, 1956, 
p. 416. 
171 Through the same mechanisms that determine the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. 
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market conditions can differ due to regional differences in the costs that the emis-
sion values bring about. Some of these limit values will be higher (and thus more 
costly) because the regional circumstances require more stringent limits to comply 
with the harmonized quality standards. In other cases the emission values will be 
higher (and more costly) because the member state concerned has, by its own choice 
(!), decided to aim for an even higher quality standard (than the harmonized mini-
mum).172 Such a practice, however, is only acceptable if our definition of a SEM is 
less absolute. 
Finally, in terms of barriers to new environmental policy instruments, the rap-
id ‘change of mind’ in the IPPC case raises questions as to the ‘level playing field’ 
with regard to participation on the EC level. In their study Faure and Lefevere 
wonder if this change has been brought about by pressure from industry, wanting 
emission standards to be set on the EC level. Of course the involvement of industry 
in itself fits perfectly with the White Paper’s viewpoint on promoting participation 
and also with notions of co-regulation. On the other hand, if we consider this matter 
from the angle of public choice theory, could it not be that the private interest per-
spective of industry has motivated the idea of pushing for standard-setting on the 
Community level, rather than on the level of member states? On the central EC level 
ENGOs still seem to have less influence than on the (sub)national level; further-
more, the standard-setting procedure on the EC level is often more depoliticized be-
cause the comitology procedure is applied.173 
From this point of view the very least that should be considered is to ensure 
that stakeholders in environmental policies have an equal say in the relevant deci-
sion-making procedures – on all levels. This is all the more relevant as environmen-
tal policies are concerned with technical expertise, and thus public authorities carry 
the risk of becoming dependent on know-how and information from industry and 
are, in a sense, ‘captured’ by industry.174 Openness and especially procedural trans-
parency can possibly remedy such an occurrence – the draft of the new European 
Convention should contain legal assurances in this respect.175 
All in all this paints a picture in which pressure for the centralized setting of 
emission limit values should be critically looked at – and with that a critical ap-
praisal of the White Paper’s approach to participation and openness seems to be in 
place. 
7.3. Aspirations for a Shift in European Environmental Governance 
It will be clear that the aspects of openness and participation and especially the 
emancipation of ENGOs is of great importance in order to create the type of ‘level 
 
172 Research shows that emission values only play a marginal role in (re)location decisions in in-
dustry!  
173 See also: R van den Bergh, M. Faure and J.G.J. Lefevere, ‘The Subsidiarity Principle in Euro-
pean Environmental Law: An Economic Analysis’, in E. Eide and R. van den Bergh (eds.), 
Law and Economics of the Environment, Oslo, Juridisk Forlag, 1995, p. 122-166. 
174 With grandfathering (or ‘rent seeking’) as a possible consequence. See M. Maloney and R. 
McCormick, ‘A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation’, Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 1982, p. 99-123. 
175 J.H. Jans, supra note 114, p. 60-64 and p. 66. 
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playing field’ which is required. Scott, Jans and their fellow members in the Avoset-
ta Group (of lawyers in European environmental law) point to the need to change 
article 230(4) EC.176 Currently access to procedures to object against EC Directives 
and regulations requires legal standing on the basis of ‘direct and individual con-
cern’ a general concern for the protection of the environment is considered an insuf-
ficient ground for legal standing. A change of criteria in the future European 
Constitution could do a great deal of good in emancipating the role of ENGOs on 
the EC level. 
Secondly, one may wonder how a change in the relationship between the SEM 
and the ideal of ‘a Europe for citizens’, guaranteeing a similar environmental quali-
ty for all Europeans, can best be brought about.  
One of the key elements to a shift could well lie in the substantive underpin-
ning of environmental law in Europe. Earlier (in § 5.1) we looked at the role that en-
vironmental principles play as benchmarks for environmental policy making. 
According to Winter, a reformulation of these principles in the European Conven-
tion, so as to enhance their legal character, is unnecessary.177 Courts and legal doc-
trine have sufficient possibilities to either promote a more restrictive or extensive 
interpretation of the existing principles.178 
A more provocative option would be to introduce a right to a clean environ-
ment. Ermacora, together with the other members of the Avosetta Group, have for-
mulated a proposal to that extent.179 The main advantages of such a basic right 
would be: firstly, to enhance the clarity of the concept itself (thereby providing legal 
certainty); furthermore, to enhance respect for such a right by individuals (which 
would amount to individuals taking EC environmental law more seriously and tak-
ing legal (court) action to defend their environmental basic right); finally, this right 
could establish the equal ranking of the environmental interest with rights such as 
the freedom to conduct a business or the right to property (arts. 16 and 17 of the 
Charter) – the emancipatory motive. 
The Avosetta Group proposes the following formulation: 
‘Everyone has the right to a clean natural environment. This right is subject to reasons 
of overriding public interest. It includes the right to participation in decision making, 
the right of access to the courts and the right to information in environmental matters. 
A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the 
environment must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accor-
dance with the principle of sustainable development’. 
 
176 J. Scott, supra note 32, p. 1001-1002. J.H. Jans, supra note 114, p. 64-66 (also for some relevant 
case law). Avosetta Group, ‘Resolution’, in J.H. Jans (ed.), The European Convention and the Fu-
ture of European Environmental Law, Proceedings of the Avosetta Group of European Environmental 
Lawyers, Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2003, p. 121, no. 8. 
177 G. Winter, supra note 114, p. 3-25, especially p. 13. 
178 A more ‘active’ role on the part of the courts could, in a moderate way, bring about some-
thing of a shift to Court Governance; see the discussion under § 2d. 
179 F. Ermacora, ‘The Right to a Clean Environment in the Constitution of the European Union’, 
in in J.H. Jans (ed.), The European Convention and the Future of European Environmental Law, Pro-
ceedings of the Avosetta Group of European Environmental Lawyers, Groningen, Europa Law Pub-
lishing, 2003, p. 29-42. For the resolution of the whole Alvosetta Group on this issue see 
ibidem p. 119-120. 
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The group refers to the fact that such a right has been recognized by the ECHR on 
various occasions and for different legal grounds and also, in some form or another, 
by many European constitutions. This Avosetta initiative coincides with a proposal 
from the ‘Green G8’: the inclusion of environmental rights in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (to the Treaty).180 
Naturally it remains to be seen whether such a basic environmental right 
would bring about a shift in environmental governance. It would still be questiona-
ble whether it would give rise to the notion of ‘a Europe for citizens’, guaranteeing a 
similar environmental quality for all Europeans and if it would even leave room for 
different ways of attaining that level of protection (through emission standards) in 
shared responsibility and possibly in a system that allows for regulatory competition. 
For the moment the present draft for the European Constitution contains few 
new initiatives for environmental policy making. According to article I.5 of the draft 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,181 a high level of protection and im-
provement of the quality of the environment is still one of the main Union objec-
tives. This is reflected in Article II.37 of the draft which stipulates that this objective 
is to be integrated into the policies of the Union and is to be ensured in accordance 
with the principle of sustainable development. Subsequently, articles III.129-131 of 
the draft offer the operational normative foundations (such as more specified objec-
tives, principles, instruments and procedures – very much like the present articles 
174-176 EC-Treaty) for the Union’s environmental policy undertakings. Finally, arti-
cle I.13 of the draft refers to the ‘Environment’ as one of the principle areas of shared 
competence between the Union and its Member States. 
 So the Convention offers no explicit initiatives for new environmental policy 
instruments. Maybe we should take this as confirmation of the leading notion in the 
6th EAP, and the preceding environmental policy practice. In their 2003 article 
Rittberger and Richardson wanted to discover, ‘[…] whether the alleged shift in the 
Commission’s environmental ‘policy style’, from a traditional regulatory style to-
wards a new style based on less impositional, more market based a co-operative in-
struments has actually occurred in practice’.182 On the ‘declaratory level’ they 
analysed what the Commission had announced in the field of legal environmental 
policy making. In comparing the 4th and 5th EAP on three key issues (external inte-
gration, participation and new instruments), through a statistically aided analysis 
(on key words per issue), they found a change towards innovation through new 
style instruments (although the analysis also showed that, even in the 5th EAP, the 
Commission was never willing to ‘throw out the baby with the bathwater’).183 In 
their analysis of the ‘operational level’ they focussed on three areas: water policy, 
waste policy and atmospheric pollution. In all areas they found that in at least 50 
percent of all Commission proposals for legislation in the period between 1994 and 
2000, command and control instruments were advocated.184 Still, in all of these in-
 
180 See the 5th ‘issue for consideration in: <http://www.eeb.org/press/Green_G8_on_Con 
vention_29_04_02.pdf>. 
181 18 July 2003 
182 B. Rittberger and J. Richardson, supra note 27, p. 575. 
183 Ibidem, p. 581-587. 
184 Ibidem, p. 591 (water); p. 593 (waste) and p. 594-597 (atmospheric/air). 
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stances there are also examples of supplementary ‘new style’ legislation, albeit only 
limited.  
In their final analysis Rittberger and Richardson assume that the Commission 
is acting ‘strategically’, looking for a balance between the existing rules, the main 
policy trends (including possible changes in rules) and stakeholders’ interests. Al-
ternatively they reason that the Commission operates on the basis of a ‘risk avoid-
ance strategy’. Convinced as the Commission may be of the need for new policy 
instruments, it is also fully aware of the need to retain the key elements of the old 
style instruments.185 Along this strand the nature of each separate environmental 
problem also plays an important role: ‘different problems might require different 
tools’.186 Clearly problems involving serious risks to human health will still warrant 
a command and control response (if only for political reasons). Again in this view 
the 6th EAP is more balanced than the 5th EAP and the old style instruments are still 
very much alive. 
7.4. Summing Up 
According to Fiorino187 governance literature suggests that there are common stages 
through which nations progress as they learn to cope with environmental problems. 
Most countries initially apply an approach which relies on direct regulation for pol-
lution sources and gradually progress to more complex strategies, with a broader 
range of instruments and more reliance on cooperative relationships between stake-
holders: ‘this progression may be seen as one from substantive to reflexive law; 
from hierarchical-adversarial to social-political governance; and from more tech-
nical to conceptual and social learning.’ The evolutionary lesson to be learned in 
Environmental Legal Policies is that ‘as the world changes, patterns of law and gov-
ernance must change with it’.188 
Clearly the White Paper and environmental law in Europe are in tune with 
this statement and join in the Commission’s attempt to bring about these necessary 
changes. On the one hand, at the declaratory level, the relevant policy documents 
almost seem to overstretch the operational, political and institutional possibilities. 
Then again, on the other hand, both the White Paper and the strategic environment 
documents (such as the EAPs) do not aim for a revolutionary shift in governance, 
but merely for a turn to good governance: aiming for closer relations between gov-
ernments in Europe and civil society, or likewise, for shared responsibility in envi-
ronmental protection. 
Given these ambitions, surely environmental law in Europe is already a case of 
‘work in progress’. Environmental policy instruments will continually have to be 
adjusted to changes, both in relation to technical and to socio-political develop-
ments. Still, however, the question remains whether effective and efficient environ-
mental policies require a genuine adjustment of existing institutional structures – 
 
185 Ibidem, p. 598. 
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indeed a shift in European governance. On a number of issues there seems to be a 
(academic) push for such a change. 
– Firstly, the issue of introducing a basic right to a clean environment; to truly in-
volve private citizens’ interest in European environmental law. This could be 
supplemented with a policy to further the use of provisions with direct effect, 
thus enabling citizens to directly appeal for their enforcement.189 
– Secondly, the issue of strengthening the legal position of ENGOs, especially on 
the EC level, alongside improved transparency in decision making (again espe-
cially on the EC level). 
– Thirdly, the issue of placing a ‘Europe of citizens’, in terms of guaranteed mini-
mum environmental quality, before the protection of the SEM, in terms of equal 
conditions for competition. 
Clearly the last-mentioned issue not only appeals to ‘idealist’ convictions for eman-
cipating the environmental interest, but it also appeals to our willingness and read-
iness for genuine institutional change. A change that may not require a legal reform 
of institutions, but that will most certainly require a change in legal policies with re-
gard to relations between the EC level and the member states. In allowing (moder-
ate) regime competition,190 such an approach could pave the way to expanding the 
possibilities for the use of more horizontal instruments (such as environmental 
agreements). Furthermore, participation by civil society would stand to gain as 
more decision-making processes would take place ‘closer to home’. Finally, putting 
a ‘Europe of and for citizens’ before other considerations could contribute to bridg-
ing the facilitative and the harmonization arenas so as to advance political trans-
fer.191 
The assignment underlying some to the contributions of this book is to look 
for ‘lessons from national law’ with regard to good governance in the EU/EC. A 
first lesson on the basis of the prior analysis of environmental law in Europe could 
be that as good governance reflects primarily the principles of openness and partici-
pation, a critical appraisal of decision making is warranted on the basis of public 
choice theory and on the need for balancing institutional powers by basic citizens’ 
rights (both substantive and procedural, including legal standing for groups, asso-
ciations and organizations) – on all levels.192 A second lesson could be to evaluate 
governance by putting more trust in what is to be gained by the diversity that Europe 
represents and acting in a less protective way in view of both the SEM and member 
states’ sovereignty (as a concept to shield against competition). Thus arrangements 
concerning co-regulation and self-regulation could proliferate over various levels of 
 
189 Minimum quality standards could be formulated. It depends on the type of pollution wheth-
er the causal chain of events leading to an excess of pollution will constrain citizens from ac-
tually pursuing their rights. 
190 Surely, minimum quality standards at the EC level would not need to be set at the lowest ac-
ceptable level. 
191 See § 4.3. 
192 Most of the debate on good governance is concerned with these – important – questions. See: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/governance/index_en.htm>.  
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government, resulting in a closer and more widespread involvement of citizens 
(both individually and in groups), associations and organizations, throughout Eu-
ropean civil societies. Much is still to be gained by working more closely through 
pluri-formity. 
 
